Abstract. The Shapley-Shubik power index in a voting situation depends on the number of orderings in which each player is pivotal. The Banzhaf power index depends on the number of ways in which each voter can e¤ect a swing. If there are n players in a voting situation, then the function which measures the worst case running time for computing these indices is in O (n2 n ) : We present a combinatorial method based in generating functions to compute these power indices e¢ciently in weighted double or triple majority games and we study the time complexity of the algorithms. Moreover, we calculate these power indices for the countries in the Council of Ministers of the European Union under the new decision rules prescribed by the Treaty of Nice.
Introduction
A simple game is a con ‡ict in which the only objective is winning and the only rule is an algorithm to decide which coalitions are winning. These games have been used to study the distribution of power in voting situations. Two power indices have received the most theoretical attention as well as application to political structures. The …rst such power index was proposed by Shapley and Shubik [8] who apply the Shapley value [7] to the case of simple games. The second power index was introduced by Banzhaf [1] and has been used in arguments in various legal proceedings.
The computation of these power indices is complex in practice because the algorithms have exponential complexity. However, using generating functions, Cantor (1962) (see Lucas [5] ) and Brams and A¤uso [3] have obtained signi…cative results for computing the Shapley-Shubik and the Banzhaf indices in weighted voting games. Starting from these ideas we de…ne algorithms to compute these indices in weighted double or triple majority games.
In section 2 we introduce the concept of generating function to solve the problem of counting the coalitions that have certain properties. Sections 3 and 4 are devoted to describe the computation of the normalized Banzhaf and the Shapley-Shubik indices of weighted m-majority games by using generating functions. The starting point of this approach are in works due to Cantor, Brams and A¤uso. Taking into account that the two decision rules approved in the Treaty of Nice are triple majority voting games, in section 5 we calculate the Banzhaf and Shapley-Shubik indices for the European Union enlargement under the Nice rules.
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Generating functions
In order to obtain the normalized Banzhaf and the Shapley-Shubik power indices exactly, we present a combinatorial method based in the generating functions. The most useful method for counting the number f (n) of elements of …nite sets S n where n 2 N, is to obtain its generating function F (x) = P n¸0 f (n) x n : For each n 2 N; the number of subsets of k elements of N = f1; : : : ; ng is given by the explicit formula of the binomial coe¢cients µ n k ¶ = n(n ¡ 1) ¢ ¢ ¢ (n ¡ k + 1) k! :
A generating function approach to binomial coe¢cients may be obtained as follows. Let S = fx 1 ; x 2 ; : : : ; x n g be an n-element set. Let us regard the elements x 1 ; x 2 ; : : : ; x n as independent indeterminates. It is a consequence of the process of multiplication that
Note that if T = ; then we obtain 1: If we put each x i = x; we obtain
Example 1. The Fibonacci numbers are a 0 = a 1 = 1; a n = a n¡1 + a n¡2 if n¸2: Then
Therefore, its generating function is
We will work with generating functions of several variables
3. The Banzhaf index A simple game is a pair (N; v) where N = f1; : : : ; ng is the set of players and v : 2 N ! f0; 1g is the characteristic function which satis…es v(S) · v(T ) whenever S µ T: A coalition is winning if v(S) = 1; and losing if v(S) = 0. The collection of all winning coalitions is denoted by W: We will use a shorthand notation and write S [ i for the set S [ fig, and S n i for S n fig:
We introduce a special class of simple games called weighted voting games. The symbol [q; w 1 ; : : : ; w n ] will be used, where q and w 1 ; : : : ; w n are positive integers with w i < q · P n i=1 w i , for i = 1; : : : ; n. Here there are n players, w i is the number of votes of player i, and q is the quota needed for a coalition to win. Then, the above symbol represents the simple game (N; v) de…ned by
where S µ N and w(S) = P i2S w i : Given the simple games (N; v 1 ) ; : : : ; (N; v m ) we consider the simple game (N; v 1^: : :^v m ) de…ned by
A weighted m-majority game is the simple game (N; v 1^: : :^v m ) where the games (N; v t ) are the weighted voting games represented by £ q t ; w t 1 ; : : : ; w t n ¤ for 1 · t · m . Then, its characteristic function is given by
where w t (S) = P i2S w t i . If m = 2 or m = 3 then we obtain weighted double or triple majority game respectively.
Let us consider a simple game (N; v). The Banzhaf index concerns the number of times each player could change a coalition from losing to winning and it requires to know the number of swings for each player i: A swing for player i is a pair of coalitions (S [ i; S) such that S [ i is winning and S is not, that is, the number of winning coalitions in which player i is pivotal. For each i 2 N; we denote by´i(v) the number of swings for i in game v; and the total number of swings is´(v) = P i2N´i (v). The normalized Banzhaf index is the vector¯(v) = (¯1(v); : : : ;¯n(v)), given bȳ
We now present generating functions for computing the Banzhaf power index in weighted double majority games Proposition 1. Let (N; v) be a weighted double majority game with v = v 1^v2 ; where v 1 = [q; w 1 ; : : : ; w n ] and v 2 = [l; p 1 ; : : : ; p n ]. For every i 2 N, the number of swings for player i is given bý
where b i kr is the number of coalitions S such that i = 2 S with w(S) = k and p(S) = r:
Proof.
First of all, we consider the set of all coalitions S such that i = 2 S with w(S)¸q ¡ w i and p(S)¸l ¡ p i : Its cardinal is given by
As w(S [ i)¸q and p(S [ i)¸l; then s i 1 coincides with the number of winning coalitions in which the player i participates.
On the other hand, inside of the set of the winning coalitions that contain player i, we consider the subset of those coalitions in which player i is not necessary for winning. The cardinal of this subset coincides with the set of all coalitions S such that i = 2 S with w(S)¸q and p(S)¸l and it is given by
Therefore, the number of swings for player
We now establish a generating function to obtain the numbers ; where b i kr is the number of coalitions S µ N such that i = 2 S; w(S) = k and p(S) = r is given by
Proof. Let us consider the polynomial B(x; y) = Q n j=1 (1 + x w j y p j ) : Expanding it, we have
Therefore, B(x; y) is a generating function for the numbers fb kr g k;r¸0 where each b kr is the number of coalitions S µ N such that w(S) = k and p(S) = r. Finally, to obtain the numbers fb i kr g k¸0; r¸0 ; it su¢ces to remove the factor (1 + x w i y p i ) in the polynomial B(x; y) giving rise to the generating function B i (x; y): ¤ With the aim of making easy the computation of the coe¢cients fb i kr g k;r¸0 ; we can use a matrix to store the coe¢cients of B i (x; y) (see Fernández [4] ). If we arrange the rows by increasing powers of x and the columns by increasing powers of y; the element b i kr is in the position (k + 1; r + 1).
1 y y 2 y 3 : : : y l¡p i : : : y l : : :
. . .
The number of swings of player i is given by the di¤erence between the sums of all elements of the outstanding submatrices. Indeed, the cardinal of the set of winning coalitions that contain player i;
can be obtained by adding all nonzero elements from the row q ¡ w i + 1 to the row w(N ni)+1; and from the column l ¡p i +1 to the column p(N ni)+1: The cardinal of the subset of winning coalitions that contain i in which his presence is not necessary for winning, that is
can be obtained by adding all nonzero elements from the row q + 1 to the row w(N n i) + 1; and from the column l + 1 to the column p(N n i) + 1: We …rst calculate the functions B i (x; y) = Q n j=1; j6 =i (1 + x w j y p j ) :
To compute the number of swings for each player the following di¤erences are calculated:´1
As the total number of swings is´(v) = 10; the normalized Banzhaf index is
For the calculation of the coe¢cients fb i kr g k;r¸0 ; we can use a matrix to store the coe¢cients of B i (x; y): The matrix that contains the coe¢cients of B 3 (x; y) is 
(b) The number of terms of B i (x; y) = Q n j=1;j6 =i (1 + x w j y p j ) ; for every i 2 N, is bounded by c:
Proof. (a) If the weights of all players are equal, that is w i = w and p i = u for all 1 · i · n; then the number of terms of B(x; y) = (1 + x w y u ) n is n + 1: If the weights are not equal then we obtain more di¤erent terms and hence n + 1 is less or equal than the number c of terms of B(x; y) = Q n j=1 (1 + x w j y p j ) : On the other hand, we have that
is a polynomial of degree w(N) in x; degree p(N) in y; and in which there are no terms such as x k or y r : Therefore, c · w(N) p(N) + 1: Moreover, at worst, c · 2 n because all exponents of the terms of B(x; y) are di¤erent and then the number c coincides with the number of the subsets of N.
The time complexity function f : N ! N of an algorithm give us the maximum time f (n) needed to solve any problem instance of encoding length at most n 2 N.
We analyze our algorithms in the arithmetic model, that is, we count elementary arithmetic operations and assignments. For instance, the algorithm for computing the product of two n £ n matrices is O ¡ n 3 ¢ : The programs of our algorithms contain only assignments and for-loop constructs. We use the symbol Ã for assignments, for example, g(x) Ã 1 denotes setting the value of g(x) to 1: A for-loop to calculate P n i=1 a i ; can be de…ned by h Ã 0 for i 2 f1; : : : ; ng do h Ã h + a i endfor output h
Computing the Banzhaf index can be considered as a counting problem: count the number´i(v) of swings for i in game v: This problem in the class of weighted majority games is #P -complete, that is, as hard any counting problem in NP (see Matsui and Matsui [6] ). We use generating functions to obtain pseudo polynomial algorithms, i.e. polynomial in n and c; for computing the Banzhaf and Shapley-Shubik indices. (b) Expanding out the polynomial B i (x; y) = Q n j=1;j6 =i (1 + x w j y p j ) for every i 2 N, requires a time O(nc), where c is the number of terms of B(x; y).
Proof. (a) If f(n) is the number of necessary operations to expand the polynomial B (n) (x; y) = Q n j=1 (1 + x w j y p j ) ; we can establish the following recurrence relation
since f (1) = 1 and for n¸2, at worst, the computation of
requires a number of products and sums with upper bounds of 2C and C respectively because C is a upper bound of the number of terms of B(x; y): If we leave out the notation O (¢) and expand the above recurrence, we have
Next, we describe the algorithm BanzT woP ower which will be used to compute the normalized Banzhaf index of all players in a weighted double majority game and we study its time complexity.
Algorithm BanzT woP ower (fw 1 ; : : : ; w n g ; fp 1 ; : : : ; p n g ; q; l) for i 2 f1; : : : ; ng do
for i 2 f1; : : : ; ng do¯i 
The time complexity of BanzT woP ower is the maximum of the time complexity corresponding to the …rst loop that determines the number of swings of all players, the time complexity of the calculation of the total number of swings, and the time complexity of the second loop that establishes the Banzhaf power index.
According
where
is the number of coalitions S that do not include player i such that w t (S) = k t , t = 1; 2; 3: In this case, we can obtain the numbers
for each player i 2 N, from the generating function
The number c of terms of the polynomial
s bounded in the following way:
To compute the normalized Banzhaf index in a weighted triple majority game, a time O ¡ n 2 c ¢ is required, where c is the number of terms of the generating function B (x; y; z).
The Shapley-Shubik index
Let (N; v) be a simple game. The Shapley-Shubik index for the player i 2 N is de…ned by
where n = jNj, s = jSj. If we assume that all n! orderings are equiprobable, then © i (v) is the probability that player i being the pivotal member of a winning coalition, that is, S [ i is winning and S is losing. Moreover, for every player i we obtain
where each d i j is the number of swings of player i in coalitions of size j: Similar to what happens with the Banzhaf index in weighted double majority games, it is also possible to obtain, using generating functions, an analogous result for the calculation of the Shapley-Shubik power index. When the game (N; v) is given by v = v 1^v2 where v 1 = [q; w 1 ; : : : ; w n ] and v 2 = [l; p 1 ; : : : ; p n ], then we have that
where a i krj is the number of coalitions S such that i = 2 S with w(S) = k and p(S) = r:
Proposition 6. Let (N; v) be a weighted double majority game with v = v 1^v2 where v 1 = [q; w 1 ; : : : ; w n ] and v 2 = [l; p 1 ; : : : ; p n ] Then, for each i 2 N, the generating function of fa i krj g k;r;j¸0 where a i krj is the number of coalitions S of j players with w(S) = k; p(S) = r and such that i = 2 S; is given by
Proof. We consider S(x; y; z) = (1 + x w 1 y p 1 z) ¢ ¢ ¢ (1 + x w n y p n z) : Expanding it, we have
where each coe¢cient a krj is the number of coalitions S µ N; such that jSj = j; w(S) = k and p(S) = r: Obviously, to obtain the numbers fa i krj g k;r;j¸0 ; it su¢ces to delete the factor (1 + x w i y p j z) in the polynomial S(x; y; z) giving rise to their generating function S i (x; y; z): ¤ Note that if we know the coe¢cients fa i krj g k;r;j¸0 , using the polynomial S i (x; y; z); then the numbers fd i j g j¸0 can be determined. These numbers can be identi…ed with the coe¢cients of a polynomial g i (z) = P n¡1 j=0 d i j z j and taking into account that
it holds
Hence we obtain that
and by Proposition 6 we have that
The elements of S i (x; y; z) can be stored in a (w(Nni) + 1) £ (p(Nni) + 1) matrix where the element of the row k + 1 and the column r + 1 is P n¡1 j=0 a i krj z j , 1 y y 2 : : : y r : : : 
Analogous to the calculation of the Banzhaf index, we determine a polynomial in z which coe¢cients represent the winning coalitions that contain player i;
On the other hand, we consider a polynomial in z which coe¢cients represent the number of winning coalitions that contain player i but his presence is not necessary for winning,
These polynomials s i 1 (z) and s i 2 (z) are obtained by adding respectively the nonzero elements from the row q ¡ w i +1 to the last and from the column l ¡ p i +1 to the last, and the nonzero elements from the w(Nni) ¡ q + 1 last rows and the p(Nni) ¡ l + 1 last columns. Finally, (b) The number of terms of S i (x; y; z) = Q n j=1;j6 =i (1 + x w j y p j z) ; for every i 2 N; is bounded by c:
Proof.
(a) A lower bound is obtained in the case in which the weights of all players are equal, that is, w i = w and p i = u; for all 1 · i · n: The number of terms of the polynomial (1 + x w y u z) n is always less or equal than the number of terms of S(x; y; z) = Q n j=1 (1 + x w j y p j z) : Therefore, c¸n + 1: To determine an upper bound we consider that
is a polynomial of degree w(N) in x, degree p(N) in y; degree n in z, and in which there are no terms such as x k , y r or z j : Therefore, c · nw(N)p(N) + 1: Moreover, at worst, c · 2 n because all exponents of the S(x; y; z) terms are di¤erent and, then c coincides with the number of subsets of N.
(b) It follows from (a). ¤
The time complexity of the algorithm to expand S(x; y; z) can be obtained by a similar proof to the one that is used in Proposition 4. (b) Expanding out S i (x; y; z) = Q n j=1;j6 =i (1 + x w j y p j z) for every i 2 N, requires a time O(nc), where c is the number of terms of S(x; y; z):
Next we describe the algorithm ShT woP ower which will be used to compute the Shapley-Shubik index of all players in a weighted double majority game and we study its time complexity.
Algorithm ShT woP ower (fw 1 ; : : : ; w n g ; fp 1 ; : : : ; p n g ; q; l) for i 2 f1; : : : ; ng do 
Proof.
According to Proposition 8, the expansion of each polynomial S i (x; y; z) requires a time O (nc) and the storage of the coe¢cients 1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1 The game v 3 is de…ned assigning to each country, a number of votes equal to the rate per thousand of its population over the total population and the quota represents the 62% of the total population. So, a voting will be favorable if it counts on the support of 14 countries with at least 255 votes, and at least the 62% of the population.
The second decision rule is the weighted triple majority game v 1^v Next, we give a table which contains the Banzhaf index if the …rst decision rule is used. In the column called Pop. I is included the percentage of population over the total, and in the column Vote I, the percentage of votes of each country over the total. The Banzhaf index of the game v 1 is included in the column Game1, and the Banzhaf index of the weighted triple majority game v 1^v2^v3 is indicated in the column Game3a. Table 2 contains the Shapley-Shubik index for the game v 1^v2^v3 ; labeled Game3a, corresponding to the …rst decision rule. Note that the Shapley-Shubik indices for the games v 1 and v 1^v2 ; labeled Game1 and Game2a respectively are equal and the results corresponding to the games v 1^v2^v3 and v 1^v2 are almost the same. Summarizing, we obtain the following conclusions:
² The …rst decision rule which consists of a triple majority system is quasi equivalent to the …rst game of quali…ed majority. The power of all countries is almost the same in the games v 1 ; v 1^v2 ; and v 1^v2^v3 .
² The second decision rule which di¤ers from the …rst one because it requires the approval at least of 2=3 of the countries is quasi equivalent to the weighted double majority game v 1^v 0 2 : In this rule, the required population quota to adopt a decision does not change the power of the countries.
² The two rules of triple majority adopted in the Nice summit meeting are almost equivalent to a simple majority game (the …rst) or a double majority game (the second). With both rules, the required population quota to adopt a decision does not change in practice the power of the countries.
